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Abstract—Smart grid allows fine-grained smart metering data
collection which can improve the efficiency and reliability of the
grid. Unfortunately, this vast collection of data also impose risks
to users’ privacy. In this paper, we propose a novel protocol that
allows suppliers and grid operators to collect users’ aggregate
metering data in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. We use
secure multiparty computation to ensure privacy protection. In
addition, we propose three different data aggregation algorithms
that offer different balances between privacy-protection and
performance. Our protocol is designed for a realistic scenario in
which the data need to be sent to different parties, such as grid
operators and suppliers. Furthermore, it facilitates an accurate
calculation of transmission, distribution and grid balancing fees
in a privacy-preserving manner. We also present a security
analysis and a performance evaluation of our protocol based
on existing multiparty computation algorithms.
Index Terms—Secure Multiparty Computation, Smart Grid,
Smart Metering, Renewable Energy Source, Security, Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART Grid (SG) is the electrical grid of the future,adding a communication network to the traditional electri-
cal grid infrastructure. This allows bidirectional communica-
tion between the different entities and components of the grid,
facilitating automated grid management. The overall aim is to
make the electrical grid more reliable and efficient [1]. This
is achieved by automatically collecting fine-grained metering
data from Smart Meters (SMs), which replace the traditional
electricity meters. These metering data include electricity con-
sumption and production measurements. Electricity production
takes place if households own a Distributed Energy Resource
(DER), e.g., solar panels. All these data are sent to the grid
operators and suppliers at regular intervals, e.g., 15 minutes.
Access to fine-grained metering data gives entities two
main advantages. Firstly, these data allow suppliers to predict
their customers’ electricity consumption and production more
accurately. These patterns are essential to allow the supplier to
predict the amount of electricity it needs to buy on the whole-
sale market for every trading period. Since suppliers pay heavy
imbalance fees for every deviation of the actual consumption
compared to their prediction, it is crucial for them to obtain
accurate consumption and production patterns. Secondly, fine-
grained metering data also allow accurate settling of all the
fees after each trading period, which is essential to realise local
electricity trading markets [2], [3]. Currently, the imbalance
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fees for the suppliers are calculated proportional to their
number of customers in each neighbourhood - i.e., households
connected to the same feeder. The current imbalance fee is
an estimate. With SM data, accurate settling of fees becomes
possible. The same is true for the distribution and transmission
fees which suppliers pay to the Distribution Network Operator
(DNO) and Transmission System Operator (TSO).
Unfortunately, fine-grained metering data also have disad-
vantages: they pose a privacy threat to users. Any entity who
has access to individual users’ fine-grained metering data can
use non-intrusive load monitoring techniques [4] to analyse
consumption patterns and infer user activities [5]. As a simple
example of how such a privacy invasion can lead to adverse
consequences, consider an insurance company which increases
the insurance fee if they observe from the consumption pattern
that their customers do not have a healthy life style. The
Netherlands have even abandoned their planned mandatory
roll-out of SMs because of the privacy issues [6].
The UK has privacy protection as a requirement for their
smart metering architecture [7]. However, their proposed archi-
tecture contains a centralised entity, the Data Communications
Company (DCC), that collects all metering data and provides
a privacy-friendly version of it to authorised entities. Although
this might ensure privacy protection against these entities (if
the privacy-friendly version is properly generated), it does not
protect against the DCC which has access to all users’ data.
There are two main approaches for user privacy protection:
anonymisation and data aggregation. Proper anonymisation
is difficult to achieve, as de-anonymisation is almost always
possible [8]. Aggregation is a better approach, but the cur-
rent proposals [9]–[11] still have shortcomings: (i) they are
designed for system models in which data are sent to only
one entity, thus they are not applicable to current electricity
markets, (ii) they do not consider electricity generated by
residential DERs and injected to the grid, and (iii) they
do not support transmission, distribution and balancing fee
calculation. The real challenge is to design solutions that
protect users’ privacy not only from external entities but also
from internal ones, and that are efficient, fault-tolerant and
applicable to real-world smart metering architecture.
In this paper we propose a secure and privacy-preserving
protocol for collecting metering data. This work extends our
previous research [12] by improving the data aggregation
algorithm. Our main contribution is twofold:
• We design a secure and privacy-preserving protocol for
collecting operational metering data which is required for
calculating distribution, transmission and imbalance fees.
Our protocol uses Multiparty Computations (MPC) as
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2the underlying cryptographic primitive and supports three
different privacy-friendly data aggregation algorithms.
Additionally, it supports realistic system models (with
multiple data recipients of aggregates of various subsets
of users’ metering data); it is fault-tolerant; it is applicable
to existing liberalised market models, and it also supports
electricity production data generated by users.
• We analyse the computational complexity and communi-
cation cost of our protocol in a realistic setting based on
the UK’s smart metering architectue [7].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II discusses the related work, Section III gives the neces-
sary preliminaries, Section IV proposes a protocol (and three
aggregation algorithms) for secure and privacy-preserving op-
erational metering data collection. Sections V and VI analyse
its security and privacy properties, and evaluate its perfor-
mance, respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Security and privacy concerns in SG have been raised [5]
and various protocols have already been proposed [9]–[17].
To protect users’ privacy, these protocols usually take two
approaches: anonymisation or aggregation. Efthymiou and
Kalogridis [13] proposed that each SM also has an anonymous
ID for reporting only operational metering data. However,
Cleemput et al. [8] showed that de-anonymisation is possible.
To achieve privacy-friendly aggregation, Li et al. [10] pro-
posed to use homomorphic encryption. However, their protocol
does not protect against active attackers nor facilitate current
electricity markets. Mustafa et al. [14], [15] addressed these
limitations by using digital signatures and a selective data
aggregation and delivery method. Garcia and Jacobs [11] com-
bined homomorphic encryption with data sharing to allow the
data recipient to aggregate the data. The use of homomorphic
encryption can protect users’ privacy, but it also introduces
high computational costs to SMs. To overcome this limitation,
Kursawe et al. [9] proposed a lightweight aggregation scheme
which requires SMs to mask their data with noise that cancels
out when added together. The scheme is computationally
efficient, but it requires a complex reinitialization process
when adding SMs and does not support flexible aggregation
groups. Rahman et al. [18] proposed a distributed aggregation
of metering data where an initialisation SM adds random value
to its metering data before sending the sum to the next SM in
the group. In turns, each SM adds their data to the accumulated
sum before the value is returned to the initial SM that extracts
the beforehand added random value to obtain the aggregate
data of all the SMs. However, the data of a SM could easily be
learnt if two of the neighbouring SMs in the ring collaborate.
Gope and Sikdar [19] proposed a privacy-preserving aggre-
gation scheme for billing and demand response management,
named EDAS, that uses random values to mask the individual
measurements of SMs. However, their scheme only partially
protects users’ privacy, i.e., the service provider is fully trusted,
thus it learns all the users metering data, and the aggregator
also learns the aggregate data of users located in the same
region. Liu et al. [20] proposed a data aggregation scheme,
named 3PDA, that uses a virtual aggregation area to mask the
metering data of individual users. Although 3PDA does not
rely on a trusted party to aggregate the data, its system model
is simplified (it has only a service provider, aggregator and
SMs), thus not practical to deploy in existing grid architecture.
Lyu et al. [21] proposed a fog-enabled scheme, named PPFA.
PPFA uses nodes that are closer to SMs to perform an initial
aggregation of the data, and then the service provider uses the
aggregate data provided by the fog nodes to extract statistics
about the users’ metering data. Although the obtained results
protect users’ privacy, i.e., they are differentially private, such
results can not be used for billing and settlements as they are
just (close) estimations of the real consumption.
He et al. [22] proposed a privacy-preserving aggregation
scheme that also protects against internal attackers. However,
their scheme uses bilinear mapping, which is computationally
expensive for devices with limited resources. He et al. [23],
[24] proposed modified schemes that outperform [22] in terms
of computation and communication costs. Knirsch et al. [25]
combined the schemes proposed in [26] and [27] to construct
a scheme for privacy-friendly fault-tolerant aggregation over
multiple sets of SMs. However, the scheme is not efficient, as
it uses computationally expensive homomorphic techniques as
well as a full round between SMs and the service provider.
Li et al. [28] proposed a privacy-preserving multi-subset data
aggregation scheme, named PPMA. Their scheme combines
two super-increasing sequences (similar to EPPA [29]) and
Paillier cryptosystem. However, the SMs of each subset are
restricted to the ones whose consumption data is within a
predefined range, limiting the usefulness of the aggregate data.
Knirsch et al. [30] use masking to achieve error-resilient
data aggregation. Although their scheme supports aggregation
over multiple sets of SMs, it adds additional communication
costs as SMs communicate between each other to exchange
their masking values. Abdallah and Shen [31], [32] proposed a
lattice-based homomorphic data aggregation scheme, whereas
Shen et al. [33] proposed a cube-data aggregation scheme that
allows aggregation of multi-dimensional data to obtain sums
of each dimension without revealing users’ private informa-
tion. However, these schemes do not support aggregation of
multiple sets of SMs. Borges and Mu¨hlha¨user [34] proposed a
homomorphic encryption-based protocol, where each SM has
two secret keys, and an authorised data recipient is aware of
the sums of all the corresponding keys of all the SMs in the
network. Each SM encrypts its metering data using its keys
and sends the ciphertext directly to the data recipient. The data
recipient aggregates all the ciphertexts and then using the sums
of the keys, it can decrypt only the sum of the SMs’ metering
data. The protocol has lower computational costs at SMs (the
costs of encryption), compared to the original Paillier scheme.
However, the decryption cost at the data recipient is high. Also,
the communication overheads are high, as each SM sends its
data to the data recipient, i.e., the aggregation is done at the
data recipient (the destination of the data), not in the network.
Tonyali et al. [35] proposed mechanisms to reduce communi-
cation overheads when somewhat homomorphic encryption is
used to perform in-network data aggregation.
Another approach to aggregate data in a privacy-preserving
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Fig. 1. System model.
(and efficient) manner is MPC. Danezis et al. [16] proposed
protocols using secret-sharing based MPC to detect fraud and
to extract advanced grid statistics. Rottondi et al. [17] proposed
a novel security architecture for aggregation of metering data.
However, their architecture requires additional nodes in the
system, i.e., gateways placed at the users’ households.
Unlike the aforementioned work, our proposed MPC-based
privacy-preserving protocol for operational metering data col-
lection (i) is based on a real smart metering architecture,
(ii) is readily applicable to a liberalised electricity market
with various stakeholders, (iii) takes into account not only
the electricity consumption data, but also electricity injected
into the grid by households, and (iv) allows the TSO, DNOs
and suppliers to calculate the exact distribution, transmission
and balancing fees based on real data rather than on estimates.
Furthermore, our protocol is fault-tolerant and it protects users’
privacy against (colluding) internal adversaries.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, our system model follows the smart
metering architecture used in the UK [36], and consists of the
following entities. Users consume electricity and are billed
for this by their contracted supplier. Distributed Energy Re-
sources (DERs) are mini generators (e.g., solar panels) located
on users’ premises. Most of the electricity they generate is
consumed by their owners. However, surplus electricity may
be injected into the grid. Smart Meters (SMs) are advanced
metering devices that measure the electricity flowing from the
grid to the house and vice versa per time slot, tk. SMs regularly
communicate with other authorised SG entities. Suppliers are
responsible for supplying electricity to all users. They buy this
electricity from generators on the wholesale market, and sell
it to users. They are also obliged to buy any electricity their
customers inject into the grid. If a supplier buys an incorrect
amount of electricity, it will be punished with imbalance fees.
Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) are responsible for
managing and maintaining the electricity distribution lines
(i.e., the low/middle voltage lines) in their respective regions.
They charge suppliers distribution fees based on the electricity
consumption of the suppliers’ customers in each time slot. The
suppliers then charge their customers this fee in turn. Trans-
mission System Operator (TSO) is responsible for managing
and maintaining the electricity transmission lines (i.e., the high
voltage lines) in the grid as well as balancing the whole grid
at any point in time. It charges suppliers transmission and
balancing fees based on the consumption of their customers
in each time slot. Similarly, suppliers pass this cost to users.
Data Communications Company (DCC) is a centralised entity
that consists of servers run by different parties. It collects and
delivers users’ metering data to the TSO, DNOs and suppliers.
We also classify some of these entities into three groups:
dealers (i.e., SMs) who provide the input data, computational
parties (i.e., DCC servers) who perform computations on the
input data, and output parties (i.e., TSO, DNOs, and suppliers)
who receive the results of the computations. The SMs generate
and provide the DCC servers with input data including the
electricity consumption and generation data measured per time
slot. The DCC servers obtain input data from the SMs, jointly
perform the necessary calculations and provide the TSO,
DNOs and suppliers with the results of these calculations.
B. Threat Model and Assumptions
All external and internal entities (i.e., users, DCC servers,
TSO, DNOs and suppliers) can act maliciously. External
entities may eavesdrop or modify data in transit trying to gain
access to confidential data or to disrupt the SG. Any user may
try to modify metering data sent by their SMs in an attempt to
gain financial advantage or learn other users’ data. The TSO,
DNOs and suppliers may manipulate users’ metering data in
an attempt to gain financial advantage, i.e., to manipulate the
transmission/distribution fees and imbalance fines calculations.
They may also try to learn individual users’ consumption data
or the aggregate consumption of any group of users located
in different regions or contracted by competitors. Any DCC
server may manipulate the metering data it receives/computes.
As our main concern is privacy protection of users, we
make the following realistic assumptions. The communication
channels among all entities are encrypted and authenticated. At
least one DCC server is honest and trustworthy, i.e., it follows
the protocol specifications. SMs are tamper-proof and sealed,
thus no one can tamper with them without being detected.
This is a common assumption in the community. If an SM is
faulty or compromised (sending false data), there are standard
techniques (e.g., use control meters) to trace back and identify
this meter. However, this is out of the scope of this paper.
C. Notations
We denote the SM of household i as SMi ∈ SM, where SM
is the set of all the SMs in the grid of a country, and the amount
of electricity taken from the grid (i.e., imported electricity) and
the amount fed back to the grid (i.e., exported electricity) by
household i during the kth time slot, tk, as E
imp,tk
i ∈ Eimp,tk
and Eexp,tki ∈ Eexp,tk , respectively. Eexp,tk and Eexp,tk are
the aggregate of consumption data and electricity fed back
data, respectively, of all the households during tk in the grid.
More notations are given in Table I. Also,
∑
(X) denotes the
aggregate (sum) value of all elements in set X .
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NOTATIONS
Symbol Meaning
tk kth time slot, k = 1, . . . ,Nt
dj the DNO operating in region j, j = 1, . . . ,Nd
su uth supplier, u = 1, . . . ,Ns
SMi the SM belonging to household i
SM set of all the SMs in a specific country
SMdj set of all the SMs operated by DNO dj
SMimpsu set of all the SMs whose users buy electricity from su
SMexpsu set of all the SMs whose users sell electricity to su
SMimpdj ,su set of all the SMs operated by dj and whose users buy
electricity from su
SMexpdj ,su set of all the SMs operated by dj whose users sell
electricity to su
Eimp,tki amount of electricity imported by household i during tk
Eexp,tki amount of electricity exported by household i during tk
Eimp,tk aggregate data of all Eimp,tki for SMi ∈ SM
Eexp,tk aggregate data of all Eexp,tki for SMi ∈ SM
Eimp,tkdj aggregate data of all E
imp,tk
i for SMi ∈ SMdj
Eexp,tkdj aggregate data of all E
exp,tk
i for SMi ∈ SMdj
Eimp,tksu aggregate data of all E
imp,tk
i for SMi ∈ SMimpsu
Eexp,tksu aggregate data of all E
exp,tk
i for SMi ∈ SMexpsu
Eimp,tkdj ,su aggregate data of all E
imp,tk
i for SMi ∈ SMimpdj ,su
Eexp,tkdj ,su aggregate data of all E
exp,tk
i for SMi ∈ SMexpdj ,su
D. Design Requirements
1) Functional Requirements:
(F1) For each time period tk, each DNO dj should access:
a) Eimp,tkdj and E
exp,tk
dj , in order to better manage the
distribution network in its region,
b) Eimp,tkdj ,su and E
exp,tk
dj ,su , for u = 1, . . . ,Ns, in order to
split the distribution fees fairly among the suppliers.
(F2) For each time period tk, each supplier su should access:
a) Eimp,tksu and E
exp,tk
su , in order to predict its customers’
electricity consumption and production accurately, so
that it can avoid receiving imbalance fines,
b) Eimp,tkdj ,su and E
exp,tk
dj ,su for j = 1, . . . ,Nd, so it can
be assured that it pays the correct transmission and
distribution network fees to the TSO and each DNO,
respectively. Transmission network fees can also be
made region-dependent to encourage suppliers to buy
electricity from sources located closer to the demand.
(F3) For each time period tk, the TSO should access:
a) Eimp,tkdj ,su and E
exp,tk
dj ,su , for u = 1, . . . ,Ns, so it can split
transmission network fees among suppliers,
b) Eimp,tksu and E
exp,tk
su , for u = 1, . . . ,Ns, so it can
calculate the imbalance fine for each supplier,
c) Eimp,tkdj and E
exp,tk
dj , for j = 1, . . . ,Nd, to identify the
regions that cause imbalance, thus to decide which
measures to take to avoid the imbalance, and
d) Eimp,tk and Eexp,tk , to balance the grid efficiently.
2) Security and Privacy Requirements:
(S1) Privacy of users: individual users’ fine-grained metering
data should not be revealed to any in(ex-)ternal SG entity.
(S2) Confidentiality of users’ data: only the authorised entities,
i.e., TSO, DNO and suppliers, should have access only
to the aggregates of users’ metering data.
Algorithm 1: Generic Equality Test
Input: Secret share bit representation of x, [x]1, . . . , [x]σ
Bit representation y1, . . . , yσ of public scalar y to which x is compared
Output: A secret share of the output of the equality test [c]
1 [c]← 0;
2 for i← 1 to σ do
3 [c′]← [x]i + yi − 2 · ([x]i · yi);
4 [c]← [c] + [c′]− [c] · [c′];
5 end
(S3) Authorisation: SG entities should be allowed to access
the aggregate data only of the users whom they provide
services to. For the DNO this means only the users living
in the region it operates, for the supplier this means only
the users who have a contract with it.
(S4) Fault tolerance: (Partial) loss of metering data should still
allow computation of aggregates of the data.
E. Cryptographic Notation
Security of MPC protocols is typically analysed in the
Universally Composable (UC) framework [37], under which,
the ideal functionality of MPC is modelled as an Arithmetic
Black Box (ABB). ABB can be seen as a generic procedure
for secure computation, where any party can send its private
input to ABB and ask it to calculate any computable function.
The functions are represented as arithmetic circuits comprising
additions, multiplications, permutations, equality tests, etc. As
long as the circuit components are UC secure, the UC frame-
work guarantees that the circuit can be executed securely. Our
protocol uses equality test and permutation as components.
Equality test can be implemented in oblivious fashion by
using just multiplications and additions. Any existing test [38],
[39] is suitable for use. To simplify it, SMs could share their
ID in its bit representation. This way the bit-wise comparison
would require only σ multiplications, where σ is the bit length
of the suppliers’ ID. Algorithm 1 illustrates this. It can be
optimised by parallelising the computation of multiplications
so that only log(σ) communication rounds are needed.
Oblivious permutation can be achieved by using an n × n
Boolean permutation matrix, where n is the size of the
input to be permuted. Under this approach each entry of
the input is multiplied against a corresponding matrix col-
umn, and the results are aggregated. This method has O(n2)
complexity. Other approaches (e.g., use of sorting networks)
can achieve better asymptotic complexity. However, using a
pre-computed permutation network this can be achieved in
(almost) O(n log(n)) complexity [40]. Such approaches have
been adapted for practical use in electricity markets [41].
We assume that all secretly shared values are members of a
field Zp bounded by a sufficiently large prime p, such that no
overflow occurs. If fixed point precision is needed, the entries
can be multiplied with a large enough constant such that they
can be shared as elements of Zp.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SMART METERING PROTOCOL
In this section we propose a privacy-preserving MPC-based
protocol for operational metering data collection. We give an
overview of the protocol, and then propose three aggregation
algorithms that offer different privacy/performance trade-offs.
5Algorithm 2: Naı¨ve Aggregation Algorithm (NAA)
Input: Tuples from region j, {[simpu ], [sexpu ], [Eimpi ], [Eexpi ]} for SMi ∈ SMdj
Output: Shares of aggregate consumption data per supplier, [Eimpdj ,su ]
Shares of aggregate production data per supplier, [Eexpdj ,su ]
1 [Eimpdj ,su ]← {01, ..., 0Ns};
2 [Eexpdj ,su ]← {01, ..., 0Ns};
3 for i← 1 to |SMdj | do
4 for u← 1 to Ns do
5 [c]← [simpu ]
?
= su;
6 [Eimpdj ,su ]← [E
imp
dj ,su
] + [c] ∗ [Eimpi ];
7 end
8 for u← 1 to Ns do
9 [c]← [sexpu ]
?
= su;
10 [Eexpdj ,su ]← [E
exp
dj ,su
] + [c] ∗ [Eexpi ];
11 end
12 end
A. Overview of our Generic Protocol
The generic protocol consists of the following four steps.
1) Input data generation and distribution: Each SM gener-
ates three data tuples, each containing different shares of the
user’s contracted suppliers, consumption and generation data,
and sends them to the corresponding computational parties.
2) Region-based data aggregation: Once the input data of
all the SMs are received, the computational parties aggregate
the consumption and generation data for each region using
one of the three aggregation algorithms described below. The
output is in shared form and represents the region-based
aggregate consumption and generation data per supplier.
3) Grid-based data aggregation: The computational parties
compute the shares of all the grid-based aggregate consump-
tion and generation data by simply adding the corresponding
shares of the region-based aggregate data.
4) Output data distribution: Following the functional re-
quirements specified in Section III, the shares of the previously
calculated aggregations are distributed to the TSO, DNOs and
suppliers, accordingly. Finally, these entities reconstruct their
required results by reconstructing the corresponding shares.
B. Region-based Data Aggregation Algorithms
In this section, we present our three region-based data
aggregation algorithms that offer different trade-offs in terms
of security, flexibility and performance.
1) Naı¨ve Aggregation Algorithm (NAA): A naı¨ve approach
to perform data aggregation with perfect privacy would be to
implement a basic circuit that uses equality tests to identify
users’ suppliers. As shown in Algorithm 2, SMs send their
tuples {[simpu ], [sexpu ], [Eimpi ], [Eexpi ]} to the DCC servers, so that
the servers can classify the inputs by using oblivious compar-
isons. Although the algorithm is fairly adaptive to a growing
number of suppliers, denoted as Ns, it is expensive in terms of
performance as it still requires O(|SMdj | · Ns) equality tests,
where |SMdj | is the number of SMs in a given region j.
2) No Comparison Aggregation Algorithm (NCAA): To
improve the performance of the aggregation algorithm, some
level of disclosure to the DCC servers can be allowed, in
this case, the number of users linked to each supplier. As
shown in Algorithm 3, the DCC servers permute the tuples
Algorithm 3: No Comparison Aggr. Algorithm (NCAA)
Input: Tuples from region j, {[simpu ], [sexpu ], [Eimpi ], [Eexpi ]} for SMi ∈ SMdj
Output: Shares of aggregate consumption data per supplier, [Eimpdj ,su ]
Shares of aggregate production data per supplier, [Eexpdj ,su ]
1 [Eimpdj ,su ]← {01, ..., 0Ns};
2 [Eexpdj ,su ]← {01, ..., 0Ns};
3 [SM′dj ]← permute([SMdj ]);
4 for i← 1 to |SM′dj | do
5 simpu ← open([simpu ]);
6 for u← 1 to Ns do
7 c← simpu == su;
8 [Eimpdj ,su ]← [E
imp
dj ,su
] + c ∗ [Eimpi ];
9 end
10 end
11 [SM′dj ]← permute([SMdj ]);
12 for i← 1 to |SM′dj | do
13 sexpu ← open([sexpu ]);
14 for u← 1 to Ns do
15 c← sexpu == su;
16 [Eexpdj ,su ]← [E
exp
dj ,su
] + c ∗ [Eexpi ];
17 end
18 end
corresponding to the same region and aggregate them in a
non-interactive way afterwards. Considering that its complex-
ity is dominated by the oblivious permutation calls, NCAA
multiplication bound is O(|SMdj | · log(|SMdj |). Also, NCAA
keeps its flexibility with respect to Ns at the cost of disclosing
the number of SMs associated to each supplier.
3) Non-Interactive Aggregation Algorithm (NIAA): To fur-
ther improve the performance of the aggregation algorithm, the
input data of SMs can be tweaked such that the aggregation
could be done without the need of communication between
the DCC servers. To achieve this, SMs have to encode their
input data into vectors of all zeros but one unique non-zero
entry. These vectors are of size Ns and the non-zero entries are
their Eimp and Eexp, respectively. This way the DCC servers
only need to process the aggregation of the shares, which
is non-interactive for any generalized Linear Secret Sharing
Scheme (LSSS). By reducing the flexibility (Ns has to be
fixed), NIAA, as shown in Algorithm 4, is implemented with
neither comparison nor multiplication operations. To support
the addition of a new supplier, SMs will have to use a vector
with a sufficiently large pre-fixed size, providing 0 for the non-
used slots, so that the system is flexible in accommodating a
large number of suppliers. An easy alternative would be to
Algorithm 4: Non-Interactive Aggr. Algorithm (NIAA)
Input: Tuples from region j, {[Eimpi ], [Eexpi ]} for SMi ∈ SMdj , where E
imp
i
and Eexpi are vectors of size Ns with only one non-zero entry at position u
Output: Shares of aggregate consumption data per supplier, [Eimpdj ,su ]
Shares of aggregate production data per supplier, [Eexpdj ,su ]
1 [Eimpdj ,su ]← {01, ..., 0Ns};
2 [Eexpdj ,su ]← {01, ..., 0Ns};
3 for i← 1 to |SMdj | do
4 for u← 1 to Ns do
5 [Eimpdj ,su ]← [E
imp
dj ,su
] + [Eimpi,u];
6 [Eexpdj ,su ]← [E
exp
dj ,su
] + [Eexpi,u];
7 end
8 end
6allow the system to feed (via an update) all the SMs with a
parameter – the number of suppliers – so that SMs will encode
their inputs as vectors of correct length. Moreover, the supplier
ID position has to be agreed in advance. NIAA also produces
no leakage, hence it achieves perfect security.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyse the security of our protocol in the Univer-
sal Composability (UC) framework [37], in which the ideal
functionality of MPC is modelled as Arithmetic Black Box
(ABB) [42]. ABB is a generic procedure for MPC providing
an abstraction of the details of MPC operations and of secret
sharing. Players can send their private input to ABB to
compute any computable function on their private inputs. The
results from the computation are stored in the internal state
of ABB to be used in the subsequent computations. Stored
values are only made public if enough number of players
agree. Formally, ABB is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (ABB Functionality FABB). The ideal function-
ality FABB for MPC is defined as follows:
• input: Receive a value α ∈ ZM and store α.
• share(α): Create a share [α] of α.
• product([α], [β]): Compute γ = α× β and store [γ].
• compare([α], [β]): Compare α and β, and return 0 if
α < β and 1 otherwise.
• equal([α], [β]): Check if α = β; return 1 if α = β, 0
otherwise.
• permute([X]): Given an input [X] ∈ ZnM return a
random permutation of it.
• open([α]): Send the value α to all players.
Addition and scalar multiplication are denoted by their cor-
responding conventional symbols + and ×.
Definition 2 (UC-security [43]). A real protocol pi is UC-
secure if, for any adversary A, there exists a simulator S for
which no environment Z can distinguish with a non-negligible
probability if it is interacting with A and pi or S and the ideal
functionality F .
Definition 3 (Universal Composition [43]). Let pi and ρ be
two protocols such that ρ 1-UC-emulates G and pi ◦ G 2-
UC-emulates F , when using G as a subroutine. Then pi ◦ ρ
(1 + 2)-UC-emulates F , when using ρ as a subroutine.
We define the ideal functionality of the operation metering
data collection protocol as follows.
Definition 4 (Ideal Functionality of Operational Metering
Data Collection Protocol FOMDCP). Given a set of input
tuples {simpu , sexpu ,Eimpi ,Eexpi } from SMs, the ideal functionality
FOMDCP computes the aggregate consumption data Eimpdj ,su and
aggregate production data Eexpdj ,su per supplier, and returns the
results to the relevant parties (i.e., suppliers, DNOs, and TSO).
Next, we show that the three region-based data aggregation
algorithms – NAA, NCAA, and NIAA – securely realise the
ideal functionality FOMDCP. This follows from the fact that all
three algorithms use MPC operations provided by ABB, which
are both sequentially and concurrently universal composable.
Theorem 1. Let piNAA be the operational metering data
collection protocol employing the NAA algorithm. Then piNAA
securely emulates FOMDCP.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of the Uni-
versal Composition Theorem 3, since (i) each ABB opera-
tion is universally composable and (ii) the NAA algorithm
comprises only ABB operations, namely, equal, addition, and
scalar multiplication.
Theorem 2. Let piNCAA be the operational metering data
collection protocol employing the NAA algorithm. Then piNCAA
securely emulates FOMDCP.
Proof. For the same reason as in the proof of the previous
Theorem. In this case, the ABB operations that are used in
NCAA are permute, equal, addition, scalar multiplication,
and open.
Theorem 3. Let piNIAA be the operational metering data
collection protocol employing the NIAA algorithm. Then piNAA
securely emulates FOMDCP.
Proof. In the case of NIAA, only addition is used, so the proof
is again straightforward.
Note that we build all our protocols over the idealised
functionality given by FABB, and no intermediate value is re-
vealed on any of them. Security then trivially follows from the
simulation of the protocols where the adversary is restricted
to what already is allowed under the ideal functionality. This
principle applies to all the results in this paper.
Fault tolerance and collusion-attacks resistance: Our solu-
tions are also fault-tolerant. This property is guaranteed due
to the fact that in all our solutions the SMs send shares of the
consumption data to the respective entities. These shares are
generated using Shamir secret sharing with a threshold, say,
τ . Therefore, even if some shares of the metering data are lost
in transit, as long as τ+1 shares are present, the DCC servers
can still compute the aggregates correctly.
Regarding security against collusion attacks, security under
MPC can be achieved under two possible settings: an honest
majority, and a dishonest majority e.g., [44]–[47]. In the
former, a majority of computational parties (i.e., at least two
of the DCC servers in our case) need to remain honest in
order to achieve perfect security. In the latter case, we can
protect against any collusion attacks as long as there is at
least one honest computational party, by choosing a protocol
secure against dishonest majority to implement the underlying
MPC functionality.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of our protocol (and
our proposed data aggregation algorithms) in terms of compu-
tational complexity and communication cost using parameters
of the smart metering architecture in the UK. In addition, we
compare our protocol to (i) the traditional protocol (denoted as
TRAD) proposed by the UK government, and (ii) the DEP2SA
protocol [15] which uses the same system model as this work.
Note that TRAD does not provide sufficient privacy protection
as the DCC access all metering data of all users.
7TABLE II
THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF OUR PROTOCOL WHEN A DIFFERENT DATA AGGREGATION ALGORITHM IS USED.
SM DCC servers TSO DNO Supplier
TRAD protocol - - - - -
DEP2SA protocol [15] 1 enc - - Ns (dec + rnr) Nd enc
Our protocol with NAA 1 share |su| × |SMdj | × Ns + |SMdj | × Ns multiplication Nd × Ns open Ns open Nd open
Our protocol with NCAA 1 share 2× (|SMdj | × log(|SMdj |) + |SMdj | multiplication Nd × Ns open Ns open Nd open
Our protocol with NIAA Ns share 0 multiplication Nd × Ns open Ns open Nd open
TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value
Nd - number of DNOs 14
Ns - number of suppliers 10
|su| - length of supplier ID 8
|SMdj | - number of SMs in each DNO 0.5M − 4M
|x|, |r| - length of data, random number 32
|[x]| - length of share 63
|c| - length of encrypted data with symmetric key 128
|C| - length of encrypted data with public key 1024
A. Computational Complexity
The most computationally demanding step of our protocol is
the region-based aggregation algorithm. Therefore, we focus
on this step. Moreover, since the cost of a share, addition
and open operations is negligible compared to the cost of
a multiplication operation (in an MPC setting), we take into
account only the number of multiplications in our calculation.
1) NAA complexity: This algorithm contains two loops
which have the same number of multiplications. For each loop,
NAA requires |su|×|SMdj |×Ns multiplications to perform the
equality tests needed, and |SMdj |×Ns multiplications needed
for the aggregation, where |su| is the bit length of the supplier
ID, |SMdj | is the number of SMs per region and Ns is the
number of suppliers in the retail market. However, as both
loops are parallelizible, the total number of multiplications in
NAA is equal to |su| × |SMdj | × Ns + |SMdj | × Ns.
2) NCAA complexity: The number of multiplications used
by the NCAA depends on the permutation network used.
For instance, the Batcher oddeven merge sorting network
requires |SMdj |× log2(|SMdj |) exchange gates. Each of these
gates requires three multiplications per item being permuted,
in this case the supplier ID and the respective electricity
consumption or generation value. Also, the open operation
performed by the DCC servers has the same computational
cost as performing a multiplication. In total, this adds up to
2×(|SMdj |× log2(|SMdj |)+ |SMdj | multiplication-equivalent
operations per loop. However, a permutation network can be
built with only |SMdj | × log(|SMdj |) exchange gates [40],
reducing the total to 2× (|SMdj | × log(|SMdj |) + |SMdj |.
3) NIAA complexity: NIAA does not perform any mul-
tiplications. As the cost of aggregation is negligible, given
that it is just an arithmetic aggregation of shares, the total
computational complexity of NIAA is negligible.
Table II summarises the computational complexity of our
data aggregation algorithms on per entity base. The cost of the
operations performed by each SM, TSO, DNO and supplier is
negligible compared to the cost of the operations performed
by the DCC servers. In terms of computational complexity,
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Fig. 2. Computational cost of the DCC servers.
NIAA is the most efficient aggregation algorithm as it does
not require any communication between the DCC servers.
Note that TRAD does not introduce any additional cost at
each entity as it does not provide privacy protection. In the case
of DEP2SA, each SM encrypts its data using homomorphic
encryption algorithm, each DNO performs Ns decryption as
well as recovery of a random number from each of the
ciphertexts it receives, and each supplier has to perform Nd
encryptions. Similarly to the case of TRAD, DCC does not
perform any computationally expensive operations.
We also conducted an experiment to test the performance
of our algorithms. We used C++ and custom implementations
of Shamir’s SSS [48], its linear addition and improved BGW
protocol from Gennaro et al. [49], all presented in [50]. We
made use of the generalized equality test from Algorithm 1.
We run the three computational parties on the same machine,
a 64-bit 2*2*10-cores Intel Xeon E5-2687 server at 3.1GHz,
thus our results do not consider network latency.
We first executed 2 million multiplications which, on aver-
age, resulted in 20.8 × 10−6 seconds per multiplication. We
then calculated the CPU time needed by our algorithms for
various settings. For our calculations we used the following
parameters based on the UK’s electrical grid [51] and smart
metering architecture [7]: Nd = 14, Ns = 10, |su| = 8, and
|SMdj | = {0.5M, . . . , 4M}. All of our simulation parameters
are given in Table III. Note that the computational complexity
does not depend on the metering data but on the smart me-
tering architecture. Figure 2 depicts our experimental results.
They indicate all the necessary CPU time required regardless
of the number of processors. Considering that in each UK
region there will be on average 2.2 million SMs, our protocol
could be executed in less than ten minutes, even if NAA
(our most computationally demanding algorithm) is used, by
simply dividing the work between eight threads, thus making
it practical for the UK smart metering architecture.
8TABLE IV
THE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF THE TRADITIONAL PROTOCOL AND OUR PROTOCOL.
SMs-to-DCC Between-DCC DCC-to-TSO/DNOs/Suppliers
TRAD protocol 2× Nd × |SMdj | × |x| 0 6× Nd × Ns × |x|
DEP2SA protocol [15] 2× Nd × |SMdj | × |C| 0 2× Nd × Ns × (2× |C|+ |x|+ |r|)
Our protocol with NAA 12× Nd × |SMdj | × |[x]| 6× |[x]| × (|su| × |SMdj | × Ns + |SMdj | × Ns) 18× Nd × Ns × |[x]|
Our protocol with NCAA 12× Nd × |SMdj | × |[x]| 6× |[x]| × (2× (|SMdj | × log(|SMdj |) + |SMdj |) 18× Nd × Ns × |[x]|
Our protocol with NIAA 6× Nd × |SMdj | × Ns × |[x]| 0 18× Nd × Ns × |[x]|
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(a) At the SMs-to-DCC part
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(c) At the DCC-to-TSO/DNOs/Suppliers part
Fig. 3. The communication overhead of our protocol at different parts of the grid.
B. Communication Cost
The communication cost of our protocol can be divided
in three parts: SMs-to-DCC, Between-DCC and DCC-to-
TSO/DNOs/Suppliers. For each part, we evaluate the com-
munication cost of our protocol when a different aggregation
algorithm is used and compare it to TRAD and DEP2SA.
1) SMs-to-DCC part: In each time slot each SM sends its
tuple to each of the DCC servers. If our protocol uses NAA or
NCAA, the format of the tuple is {[simpu ], [sexpu ], [Eimpi ], [Eexpi ]}.
Assuming there are three DCC servers, the communication
cost is 3×Nd × |SMdj | × ([simpu ] + [sexpu ] + [Eimpi ] + [Eexpi ]). If
our protocol uses NIAA, the tuple’s format is {[Eimpi ], [Eexpi ]},
where {[Eimpi ], [Eexpi ]} are shares of vectors with size Ns. This
adds up to a cost of 3×Nd×Ns×|SMdj |×([Eimpi ]+[Eexpi ]). If
TRAD is used, each SM sends {Eimpi ,Eexpi } to the DCC which
is a single entity in this case. This results in a communication
cost of Nd × |SMdj | × (Eimpi + Eexpi ). If DEP2SA is used,
the communication cost is Nd×|SMdj |× (Cimp+Cexp), where
Cimp and Cexp are the ciphertext of Eimpi and E
exp
i , respectively.
Note that these ciphertexts are the results of the homomorphic
encryption operation performed by the SMs.
2) Between-DCC part: In each time slot the DCC servers
need to communicate between each other in order to preform
the necessary computations for calculating the region-based
aggregates per supplier. As each multiplication equals the
transmission of a share from each of the DCC servers to the
others, the communication cost for this part can be calculated
by simply multiplying the total number of multiplications
(given in Table II) with the total number of shares exchanged
between the DCC servers per multiplication. In our case this
is equal to 6× |[x]|, where |[x]| is the size of a share. TRAD
and DEP2SA do not have any communication cost in this part.
3) DCC-to-TSO/DNOs/Suppliers part: In each time slot the
DCC servers need to send the computed results to the TSO,
DNOs and suppliers. As the output data of NAA, NCAA and
NIAA is the same, the communication cost for this part is
the same regardless of the aggregation algorithm. In detail,
each DCC server has to send (i) Nd × ([Eimpdj ,su ] + [E
exp
dj ,su ]) to
each supplier, (ii) Ns× ([Eimpdj ,su ] + [E
exp
dj ,su ]) to each DNO, and
Nd × Ns × ([Eimpdj ,su ] + [E
exp
dj ,su ]) to the TSO. This results in a
total communication cost of 9×Nd×Ns×([Eimpdj ,su ]+[E
exp
dj ,su ]).
If the suppliers and DNOs trust the TSO (which is usually the
case in practice), they could directly obtain the aggregation
results from the TSO. In that case, the communication cost
will be reduced to 3 × Nd × Ns × ([Eimpdj ,su ] + [E
exp
dj ,su ]) +
(Nd + Ns) × cdj ,su , where cdj ,su is an encrypted message
containing the region-supplier based aggregate consumption
and production data, i.e., cdj ,su = Enck(E
imp
dj ,su ,E
exp
dj ,su). If
TRAD (DEP2SA) is used, the DCC sends the respective (ci-
phertexts of the) aggregate consumption and generation data,
Eimpdj ,su ,E
exp
dj ,su (C
imp
dj ,su ,C
exp
dj ,su), to the output parties. This results
in a communication cost of 3 × Nd × Ns × (Eimpdj ,su + E
exp
dj ,su)
for TRAD. In the case of DEP2SA. each DNO also sends the
respective aggregate of the consumption and generation data,
as well as a random number extracted from each ciphertext, to
each of the suppliers. This results in a communication cost of
Nd×Ns×(2×Cimpdj ,su+2×C
exp
dj ,su+E
imp
dj ,su+E
exp
dj ,su+r
imp
dj ,su+r
exp
dj ,su).
Table IV summarises the communication cost of our pro-
tocol (with a different aggregation algorithm used), TRAD
and DEP2SA, where |x|, |[x]|, |C|, and |r|, denote the length
of a message, its share, a ciphertext and a random num-
ber, respectively. Furthermore, using the parameters from the
previous section and setting |x| = |r| = 32, |[x]| = 63,
|c| = 128 and |C| = 1024, we depict the communication
cost of our protocol at each part and the entire smart metering
architecture in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively. As expected, our
protocol has higher communication cost than TRAD due to the
privacy protection it offers. In comparison to DEP2SA, only
9TABLE V
COMPARISON OF OUR PROTOCOL WITH EXISTING AGGREGATION PROTOCOLS.
Feature/Property Our TRAD [15] [16] [17] [19] [20] [21] [23] [28] [30] [32] [33] [34] [35]
Real smart metering architecture Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No
Multiple data recipients Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Flexible subsets of SMs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Consumption & production data Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No Yes No No
Multiple grid fees calculation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No
Easy supplier switch for users Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No
Easy SM addition/removal Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes No No No
Confidentiality of user data Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Internal-attackers resistance Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Privacy of users Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Authorisation Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No
Fault tolerant Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No
Collusion-attacks resistance Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No No
Require secure channels* Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No Yes No
Computational cost at SMs L L H H L L H L M H L M H H H
Computational cost at recipients L L M L L L L L L H L L L H H
Communication cost at SMs level L L L L L L L L L L H L L L H
Overall communication cost M L L L M L L L L L H L L L M
Scalable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
*This can be provided via the TLS/SSL protocol. L - Low, M - Medium, H - High
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Fig. 4. The total communication overhead for our protocol.
our protocol with NCAA performs better. Regarding the choice
of data aggregation algorithms, NCAA is the most efficient.
However, this algorithm discloses towards the DCC servers
the number of users linked to each supplier. In practice, such
disclosure can be tolerated by users. If such disclosures are
not accepted, NAA or NIAA should be used. Both algorithms
have comparable communication costs, the difference being
in the part of the smart metering architecture where the cost
is concentrated. In the case of NAA, the main cost incurs at
the Between-DCC part, whereas in the case of NIAA – at the
SMs-to-DCC part.
C. Comparison with Existing Aggregation Protocols
Table V gives an overview of the comparison of our protocol
with existing (privacy-preserving) smart metering data aggre-
gation protocols in terms of features, functionalities, security
and privacy properties as well as performance. Although most
of the existing solutions provide a sufficient protection of
users’ privacy, they do not support functionalities needed for
a real-world smart metering architecture. It is clear that our
protocol is the only one that, apart from protecting users’
privacy, is readily deployable in a real-world smart metering
architecture due to the functionalities it supports as well as its
low overhead and good scalability.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced an MPC-based protocol for aggregating
electricity data, related to consumption and generation, in a
secure and privacy-friendly manner. These data are required
for operational purposes such as calculating the transmission,
generation and balancing fees. Furthermore, we introduced
three data aggregation algorithms that offer different security
and performance trade-offs. We also analysed the associated
computation and communication costs of all our protocols.
Our results indicate the feasibility of our protocol for a setting
based on a real smart metering architecture. As a future work,
we will aim to have a testbed implementation of our protocol
in order to test its performance in a real-world environment.
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